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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah, in the interest of A.M.S. and A.S.,
persons under eighteen years of age.
K.P.S.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

maternal grandparents pending completion ot the
investigation. A.M.S. was subsequently examined at
a Children's Justice Center by another physician and
nurse who concluded A.M.S. had been sexually
abused. Allegations of Father's sexual abuse had
previously been made in Arizona but were
unsubstantiated. In addition, A.S. remembered
instances of physical abuse, including being hung on
a hook on a wall by Father, and both children
recounted seeing Father physically abuse mother and
were afraid they would be hurt i^ they returned to
Father.

1(5 Upon Father's return to Arizona, he moved for an
order to show cause why the maternal grandparents
No. 9904S2-CA
had not complied with the temporary custody order.
FILED: June 15,2000
Meanwhile, DCFS filed a verified petition in Utah
2 0 0 0 U T A p p 182
seeking an adjudication that the children were abused
or neglected and thus within the juvenile court's
Second District Juvenile, Farmington Department
jurisdiction, and requesting an order that, among
The Honorable Diane W. VVilkins
other things, awarded temporary custody of the
children to their maternal grandparents. In turn,
ATTORNEYS:
Father moved to transfer jurisdiction over the Utah
Terry L. Cathcart and Ross E. McPhail, proceedings to Arizona, arguing the same was
Bountiful, for Appellant
required under the Uniform Child Custody
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), see Utah Code Ann.
for Appellee
§§78-45c-l to -26 (1996), 1 as a modification of the
Jan W. Arrington, Layton, and Martha Pierce, Arizona custody order.
Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem
^j6 The juvenile court conducted a telephone
conference with the Arizona court regarding
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
jurisdiction. Both courts agreed that entry of the Utah
juvenile court's temporary order was an appropriate
This Opinion is subject to revision before final
exercise of emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
to prevent abuse of the children. The Utah court
I further concluded that because the verified petition
DAVIS, Judge:
was brought by DCFS "as a child protection matter
^jl K.P.S. (Father), the father of the two minor and is not a true motion to alter or amend the custody
children at issue, A.M.S., the eldest and a girl, and rights of [Father]," the verified petition was not "a
A.S., a boy, appeals the trial court's order granting custody modification matter covered by the UCCJA."
custody to the children's maternal grandparents. We Accordingly, it denied Father's motion to transfer
affirm, but modify in part the court's order.
jurisdiction. The Arizona court, however, declined to
BACKGROUND
defer jurisdiction to the State of Utah, opting instead
%L Although they never married, Father and K.V. to stay its proceedings until the Utah proceedings
(Mother) are the parents of A. M.S. and A.S. Issues of were complete.
custody and child support were initially resolved \1 The Utah court held a pretrial hearing pursuant to
through a paternity action in Arizona, where Father which it directed the parties to exchange lists of
and Mother then lived, through orders of the Superior witnesses they intended to call at trial, scheduled for
Court of Arizona, Maricopa County.
March 3-5, 1999. In both its initial list of witnesses
^3 On December 31, 1997, Mother suffered a and its amended list—filed approximately three weeks
debilitating stroke and entered into a coma. As a before trial—DCFS omitted any reference to D.V.,
result, Father and the children's maternal Mother's husband and the children's stepfather.
grandparents, with whom the children were living in Nonetheless, on the first day of trial when the court
Utah, Filed petitions for temporary custody with the directed DCFS to present its first witness, DCFS
Arizona court. The court awarded temporary custody indicated it wanted to call D.V. notwithstanding his
to Father and ordered the maternal grandparents to omission from the witness lists, acknowledging the
turn over the children on June 5, 1998.
omission occurred because counsel "just plain
\A As the deadline for turning over the children drew overlooked him." Over Father's objection for lack of
near, A.M.S. experienced stomach problems and notice and untimeliness that deprived Father of the
stress related to concerns about living with Father. ability to investigate D. V.'s credibility and otherwise
She indicated generally to her therapist that she had prepare for cross-examination, the court permitted
been sexually violated by Father and later disclosed D.V. to testify.
to a physician and nurse that Father "sticked his <|8 On the second day of trial, the Guardian Ad Litem
private parts against me and said if 1 told anyone he for the children indicated she would call the children
would kill my Mom and he threatened me." When to testify and asked that Father be excluded during
Father arrived from Arizona to receive custody of the this time. The Guardian asserted that exclusion was
children, the Division of Child and Family Services permitted under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of
(DCFS) informed him of medical Findings that Juvenile Procedure because the children were fearful
indicated A.M.S. had been sexually abused and \ of Father. Father objected, arguing the motion to
UTAH ADVANCE R E P O R T S
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Under the UCCJA, because the Arizona court
made the initial custody determination when all
parties resided in Arizona and Father continues to so
reside, a Utah court generally may not modify that
determination. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l)
(1996); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (stating that the decree state continues to
havejurisdiction when father continues to reside there
and have visitation contact with children and "[t]he
continuing jurisdiction of the court in which the
I decree originated is intended to remain exclusive");
Crump v. Cnwip? 821 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that jurisdiction did not shift to
Utah from Montana when mother and children moved
there because father remained in Montana); In re
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 ("'The jurisdiction of state A
continues and is exclusive as long as the husband
lives in state A . . . ."') (citation omitted; emphasis
omitted). Hence, Father is correct that ordinarily the
maternal grandparents should have brought their
request for custody and the evidence of abuse on
which it was based to the Arizona court.
1J14
Nonetheless, under section 78-45c-3(l)(c) a
Utah court may make a temporary custody
determination if the child is present in Utah and "it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to" or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or
dependent." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l )(c) (1996).
As this court explained, emergency jurisdiction '"is
reserved for extraordinary circumstances'" and
"should be limited to those cases of neglect where the
harm is immediate or imminent." In re D.S.K., 792
P.2d at 126-27 (citation omitted). Father argues that
the only emergency here was based on the imminent
transfer of custody. While he may be correct that this
alone cannot support the exercise of emergency
jurisdiction, the imminent transfer coupled with the
court's factual findings that by clear and convincing
ISSUES
evidence the children had been physically and
TJ10
Father raises the following grounds for
sexually abused-which findings Father does not
reversal: (1) because the Utah court was without
challenge on appeal—was sufficient under section
jurisdiction to entertain the matter under the UCCJA,
78-45c-3(l)(c). Accordingly, we conclude that the
it erred in denying his motion to transfer the matter to
court could properly enter a temporary order granting
the Arizona court; (2) the court erred in allowing
custody of the children to the maternal grandparents.
D. V. to testify when DCFS failed to include D. V. in j
1J15
However, the court erred in the scope of its
its witness list; and (3) the court erred in excluding I
order. Emergency jurisdiction is limited to measures
Father from the courtroom during the children's
necessary to protect the children and, hence, section
testimony.
78-45c-3(l)(c) of the Utah Code does not empower
ANALYSIS
the court "to make a permanent custody disposition."
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 127. Rather, orders entered
^[11
We First review the trial court's determination
through the court's emergency jurisdiction are
regarding its jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Because
temporary in nature and have effect only pending
the competency of the juvenile court to decide the
adjudication of the issues in the decree state. See id.
case raises a question as to the court's subject matter
Accordingly, we herewith modify paragraphs one and
jurisdiction, it presents a question of law we review
three of the trial court's order to the effect that the
for correctness. See In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123
orders contained therein are temporary only pending
(UtahCt. App. 1990).
further order of the Arizona court in the modification
^12
On appeal, DCFS concedes the trial court
and such other proceedings as may be brought therein
erred in concluding the UCCJA was inapplicable
by the parties. To the extent the orders of the trial
merely because the verified petition was filed by
court herein purport to exercise anything other than
DCFS. The UCCJA expressly provides that a custody
temporary, emergency jurisdiction, the same are
proceeding to which it applies "includes child neglect
reversed.
and dependency proceedings." Utah Code Ann.
Admission of D.V.'s Testimony
§78-45c-2(3) (1996); see also In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d
We now turn to Father's claim that the court
at 123 ("By claiming it retained jurisdiction over the %\6
neglect allegations, the juvenile court granted should have excluded the testimony of D.V. because
pennancnt custody to father and thereby clearly DCFS failed to designate him as a witness before
trial. The court has broad discretion in determining
modified the custody decree entered in Florida.").
UTAH ADVANCE R E P O R T S
exclude him was untimely and that he had a right to
be present during the testimony. The court, however,
found that the children "are young, testimony came in
indicating that they are currently nine and seven years
of age. There was a great deal of testimony, both from
the therapist and from other fact witnesses yesterday
regarding fear and anxiety they have of the father."
Consequently, the court granted the Guardian's
request, but accommodated Father by allowing him to
sit in the hallwayjust outside the courtroom where he
could listen to the testimony. Although Father
requested to view the children's testimony via closed
circuit television, the court explained it did not have
the required equipment. Thus, although he objected,
Father accepted the court's accommodation. Father's
counsel remained in the courtroom.
H9 After trial, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that based on various facts,
including that the children were fearful of returning to
Father and that such fears are based in reality;
medical findings corroborated A.M.S.'s claim that she
had been sexually abused; and A.M.S.'s injuries
occurred during the time when she had extended
visits with Father, Father had sexually abused A.M.S.
The court further found by clear and convincing
evidence that both children witnessed Father's
physical abuse of Mother and they themselves had
suffered severe physical abuse by Father.
Consequently, the court determined the children were
within thejuvenile court's jurisdiction, A.M.S. was an
abused child, and both A.M.S. and A.S. were
neglected. The court ordered that the maternal
grandparents retain custody of the children and Father
be allowed only supervised visitation. The court
further ordered that it would defer to the Arizona
court for the appropriate amount of child support
Father should pay to the maternal grandparents.
Father appeals.

Provo. Utah

whether to allow a witness to testify and this court
will not reverse such ruling unless it abused that
discretion, substantially affecting Father's rights. See
Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999
UT37,K16, 977 P.2d 1205.
]] 17
First, although Father is correct that the court
could have excluded D. V.'s testimony because DCFS
failed to comply with the court's order on witness
disclosure, see Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41^26,
974 P.2d 306, he simply fails to show that such
sanction was required here. Moreover, because
"[ejxcluding a witness from testifying is . . . 'extreme
in nature and . . . should be employed only with
caution and restraint,'" Berrett v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (citation omitted; omission in original),
we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.
^| 18
Second, even if the court somehow abused its
discretion by allowing D.V. to testify, Father has not
shown prejudice by the ruling. Father's sole claim of
prejudice is that D.V.'s testimony contained hearsay
that was "inflammatory" and "susceptibilfe] to
embellishment." However, Father was still free to
object to those parts of D.V.'s testimony that were
inadmissible. Hence, any admission of hearsay
flowed not from the denial of Father's requested
sanction from which he now appeals, but from his
failure to make proper objections. Father also fails to
allege what, if anything, he would have done
differently had D.V. been designated. Accordingly,
we reject Father's attempt to predicate reversal on
these grounds.

CONCLUSION
71| 21
We conclude that the court correctly
determined that it could hear this matter under the
emergency jurisdiction provision of the UCCJA.
Nonetheless, because the court's authority under the
UCCJA is limited to temporary orders, we modify the
order here such that it has effect only pending final
resolution by the Arizona court. Further, we conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing D.V.
to testify or by requiring Father to listen to the
children's testimony from the hallway outside the
courtroom.
%L2
Affirmed and modified.2
James Z. Davis, Judge
1123

WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. We acknowledge the Utah Legislature recently repealed
and reenacted the UCCJA effective July 1, 2000, and in so
doing overruled this court's holding in In re R.NJ., 908
P.2d 345, 348-49 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), that the UCCJA
does not apply to proceedings to terminate parental rights.
See 2000 Senate Bill 104, § 2 (stating that the term "'child
custody proceeding'-. . . includes a proceeding for . . .
termination of parental rights"). Nonetheless, because those
changes are inapplicable and would not alter our analysis
here, we cite to the provisions in effect at the relevant times.
2. We reject Father's request for attorney fcts and costs
incurred below and on appeal because he made the request
for the first time during oral argument. See Utah Med.
Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Utah 1998)
("[T]he issue of attorney fees is not properly before this
court because it was raised for the first time on appeal.");
Larson v. Overland Jlirift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1321 n.5
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (declining to consider issue of
attorney fees when raised for first time in reply brief).

Exclusion from Courtroom During Testimony
TI19
Finally, Father asserts this court should
reverse because he was excluded from the courtroom
during the children's testimony and thus was able to
participate only by listening from the hallway. Father
argues that his exclusion was not authorized by Utah
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 50. While Father may be
correct that the court failed to strictly comply with
Rule 50, he overlooks that the juvenile court has
broad discretion to control its proceedings. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-7-5 (1996) ("Every court has
authority to . . . (3) provide for the orderly conduct of
proceedings before it or its officers; [and] . . . (5)
control in furtherance of justice the conduct of... all
other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter . . . ."); cf.
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293 ("Trial courts have broad
discretion in managing the cases assigned to their
courts [and w]e will not interfere with a trial court's
case management unless its actions amount to an
abuse of discretion.") (citation omitted).
\2Q
Here, Father concedes that the Sixth j
Amendment right to confrontation does not apply and
has otherwise failed to cite any authority requiring
reversal for his exclusion from the courtroom during
the children's testimony. Given that based on the
court's finding that the children feared Father and
there was a possibility that Father's presence could
have inhibited the children's ability to testify, Father
has not persuaded us that the court abused its
discretion. Indeed, the court appears to have struck an
appropriate balance by allowing Father's substantial
participation through his counsel remaining in the
courtroom and questioning the witnesses and Father
listening from the hallway. Consequently, we reject
Father's argument for reversal on this basis.
UTAH A D V A N C E R E P O R T S
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2(a)-3(c) of the Utah
Code.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do the provisions of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28

U.S.C. §1738A apply to proceedings to permanently terminate parental rights of a parent by
the Juvenile Courts of the State of Utah when the parent whose parental rights are in issue
continues to reside in the jurisdiction (State) which granted the Decree of Divorce and
which Court has granted and enforced grandparent visitation after entry of the Decree of
Divorce?
As the issue presented is interpretation of existing statutory and case law, it presents
an issue of law which is reviewed for correctness. In Re: adoption of A.B.. 1999 UT. App.
315,991 P.2d70,f 8.
The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (R. 23-61) and was
specifically addressed by the trial court in its memorandum decision. (R. 126-131, in
particular R. 127-130).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES TERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL
Article VI clause 2 to the Constitution of the United States provides:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof,..., shall be the supreme law of the land, and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding."
Section 1738A of Title 28 U.S.C. provides:
(a)

(b)

The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this
section, any child custody determination made consistently with the
provisions of this section by a court of another state.
As used in this section, the term (1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent,
who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child;
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the custody and includes
permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and
modifications;
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding
the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a
person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in
which the child livedfrombirth with any of such persons.
Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are
counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation
determination concerning the same child, whether made by the
same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent,
who has physical custody of a child and who has either been
awarded by a court or claims a right to custody.
Page 2

(7)

"physical custody" means actual possession and control of a
child;
(8)
"State" means a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or
possession of the United States, and
A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State
is consistent with the provisions of this section only if(1)
such court has jurisdiction under law of such State; and
(2)
one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the
child's home State within six months before the date of
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant
or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such
State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (a), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that a court of such state assume jurisdiction because (I)
the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other
than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is
available in such State substantial financial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships.
(C)The child is physically present in such State and (i) the child
has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been subjected or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse;
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State
whose jurisdiction is in issue is more appropriate forum to
determine the custody or visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in
the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction;
or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection
(d) of this section.
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody
or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this
Page 3

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of
this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant.
Before a child custody determination or visitation is made, reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants,
any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated
and any person who has physical custody of a child.
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the
same child by a court of another State if(1)
it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination;
and
(2)
the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for
a custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency
of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of
this section to make a custody determination.
A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a
court of another State unless the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction to modify such determination or has declined to exercise
jurisdiction to modify such determination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the 1995 decision of State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995)
this Court ruled that a petition for the voluntary termination of an adoptive parent's parental
rights was not a custody proceeding under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, § 78-45c-l, et sec, of the Utah Code. The trial court applied that rational to rule in
this case that a permanent deprivation proceeding is not a custody case, the Parental
Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A, did not apply to the instant action.
That decision is erroneous under the facts of this case where Appellant had always

Page 4

continued to reside in the state (California), the court which granted the Decree of Divorce
and father's custodial and visitation rights and which granted visitation rights to his parents,
the paternal grandparents (who have always resided in California). The PKPA, § 173 8A of
Title 28 U.S.C., prevents the trial court from assuming any jurisdiction over this matter
except to enforce the existing California court orders.
FACTS
The natural mother and her husband, the perspective adoptive father, filed a Petition
for Termination of the Appellant's parental rights and for adoption of E.H.H. on June 18,
1999 (R. 3). They alleged that the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County, State
of Utah, had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-3a-104 of the Utah Code.
The natural father and natural mother were divorced on July 21, 1995 in the State of
California where Appellant continues to reside. (R. 3-4). Service of the adoption petition
was effected on the natural father where he resides in San Diego County, California. (R. 7,
14). The paternal grandparents have not been served or joined in this action despite the
Court orders granting and enforcing their visitation rights.
The father immediately challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the
matter under the PKPA (R. 19-20). The trial court was advised that after entry of the
decree of divorce the father's parents were granted specific visitation with the minor child
who is the subject of this action, (R. 45-51) and when K.B. failed to comply with the orders
of the trial court (Superior Court of California, County of San Diego), and on January 20,
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1998, after she was found to be in contempt of court on two counts, she was sentenced to
two years probation conditioned upon her complying with all existing orders of the Court
(R. 52-55).
Both the Appellant and his parents continue to reside in San Diego County, State of
California and that Court continues to actively exercise its jurisdiction. The most recent
order of that Court was entered on May 5, 1999, see (R. 56-58). Accordingly, after service
upon him, the natural father moved to dismiss the Petition in the First District Juvenile
Court for Box Elder County, State of Utah, on the ground that the Utah Court did not have
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions of the PKPA, § 173 8 A of Title 28 of
the U.S.C. (R. 23-61, 88-92). After the trial court overruled Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss, on November 8, 1999, (R. 150-155), he filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
(R. 141-164). This Court granted the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on January 24,
2000, (R. 179), and the matter now pends here.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court, a Juvenile Court in the State of Utah, does not have jurisdiction to
consider a Petition for Permanent Deprivation of Parental Rights which would terminate
the custody and visitation rights of a natural parent and visitation rights of grandparents
who have been granted court ordered visitation (but have not been joined by Petitioners)
where the parent and grandparents continue to reside in the jurisdiction of the trial court
that granted, and is actually enforcing, those rights under the provisions of the PKPA, 28
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U.S.C. §1738A.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANT WHEN
HE CONTINUES TO RESIDE IN THE JURISDICTION WHICH
GRANTED THE DIVORCE AND IS ENFORCING VISITATION
RIGHTS,

In the case before the Court, the parties were divorced in the Superior Court for San
Diego County, State of California. The Appellant, Charles Harris, continues to reside in
that county. After the entry of the Decree of Divorce which granted KB, mother, the right
to move to Maryland and Appellant (hereinafter father) visitation rights, his parents,
Charles and Leanne Harris, were granted visitation rights with E.H.H. by the same court.
Later when K.B. failed to comply with the visitation orders and secretly moved to Utah
(concealing the child for one year), the Superior Court of California for San Diego County
exercised its continuing jurisdiction by holding K.B. in contempt of its orders and placing
her on probation for two (2) years.
The provisions of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A which apply to this case provide:
"The appropriate authorities of every state shall enforce according to its
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in Subsection (f) of this
section, any child custody determination made consistently with the
provisions of this section by a court of another State. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1738A(a) of Title 28 U.S.C.
"(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation
determination made by a court of another State unless the court
Page 7

of the other State no longer has jurisdiction to modify such
determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify
such determination."
Section 1738(A)(h) of Title 28 U.S.C.
As defined in Subsection (b) of Section 1738A: "contestant" means a parent or
grandparent who claims arightto custody or visitation of a child." Subsections (3) and (5)
provide that a modification means a change in the prior custody or visitation determination
regarding a child and Utah is a "State" as defined in Subsection (8).
Consequently, the courts of Utah may make a change in the custody or visitation
orders of the Superior Court for San Diego County, State of California, only if:
(f) "A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the
same child made by the Court of another State, if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination;
and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination."(emphasis added).
Subsection (d) of the statute provides:
(d)

The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody
or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this
section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of
this section continues to be met and such State remains the
residence of the child or of any contestant. (Emphasis added.)

Both Charles Harris and his parents are contestants as defined in § 1738 A(b)(2) and
they continue to reside in San Diego County, State of California. The Superior Court for
San Diego County is actively exercising jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the

Page 8

Courts of Utah have jurisdiction only to:
"Enforce according to its terms and shall not modify, the existing custody and
visitation orders."
Section 1738A(a) of Title 28 U.S.C.
The interrelationship between the the Uniformed Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
the PKPA was explored by this Court in Crump v. Crump. 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App.
1991). In its opinion, this court noted it had previously ruled in State in Interest of D.S.K..
792 P.2d 118, 128 (Utah App. 1990).
"Where the PKPA and the state's version of the UCCJA conflict, the
PKPA preempts state law."
Crump, 821 P.2d at 1174.
This Court then went on to note that UCCJA failed to address the specific problem
of continuing jurisdiction and that was resolved by the PKPA. Crump, 821 P.2d at 11741175. Then, pertinent to the instant matter, this Court stated:
"Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA 'anchors exclusive continuing
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that
state.' Annotation, 83 A.L.R^**1 at 748 (emphasis added). See also
Dickens, 23 J.Fam.L..at 426. 'While under the UCCJA scheme some
states profess to find modification jurisdiction so long as they can
properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a
second statefrommodifying an initial state's order except in carefully
circumscribed situations.'" Meade v. Meade. 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th
Cir. 1987). This is clear from section (f) of the PKPA which states
that:
"A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody
of the same child made by a court of another State, ifPage9

(1)
(2)

it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody
determination; and
the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or
it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify
such a determination." 28 U.S.C. §1738A (1989).
(Emphasis added.)

821 P.2d at 1174-1175, and
"This section explicitly limits when a State, which would
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order."
821P.2datll75.
Applying this rational to the instant case, it is clear that the PKPA applies and
requires dismissal of K.B.'s petition. Consider the scenario if this Court rules the PKPA
does not apply and permits the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County to hear
the petition for permanent deprivation now before it. Should that court grant the petition
and petition for adoption, the father and his parents could, using the PKPA, file an action to
enforce their visitation in the District Court after the adoption has been granted by the
Juvenile Court. The District Court would have no choice but to enforce visitation under the
PKPA.
In the decision of In re adoption of A.B.. 991 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1999) this Court
reviewed the decision of the trial court regarding grandparent visitation rights and ruled
that Utah law, as articulated in Kasper v. Nordfelt 815 P.2d 747 (Utah App. 1991), that
when a natural parent's parental rights are terminated, the grandparental rights to exercise
visitation are also terminated. 991 P.2d at 76. Consequently, if the trial court in the instant
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matter were to terminate the visitation rights of the father and his parents, it would be
terminating both his visitation rights and the visitation rights of his parents, which it may
not do under the PKPA.
Since the trial court decision would terminate visitation rights of the Appellant and
his parents, it would be modifying the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
State of California, an action it is specifically prohibited from taking under the PKPA as
interpreted and applied by this Court in Crump supra. The PKPA, under the facts of this
case, clearly prohibit the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County, State of Utah,
from exercising jurisdiction over the petition to permanently deprive the parental rights of
appellant. The decision of the trial judge overruling the Motion to Dismiss based on lack
of jurisdiction should be reversed by this Court which should remand the matter and order
the petition of K.B. and M.B. be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks this Court's reversal of the trial court's decision that it has
jurisdiction over this matter and a remand to that court with the direction to dismiss the
Petition of Petitioners K.B. and M.B.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2000.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of COHNE,
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and that on the 16th day of March, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Miles Holman
Holman, Walker and Hutchings
9537 South 700 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Attorney for Petitioner
Roger Baron
Attorney at Law
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, UT 84302
Attorney for Petitioner

(map, Wrbjr
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

Memorandum Decision by Judge Larry E. Jones
on June 21, 1999, and entered November 8, 1999

EXHIBIT B

Pleadings entered in The Superior Court of
California for the County of San Diego
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
HARRIS, Emily Hope

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 974919

A person under eighteen years of age

This matter comes before this Court on Karen Butler's and Mark Butler's Petition for
Termination of Natural Father's Parental Rights and for Adoption of Child filed in this Court
on June 21, 1999. Charles Erik Harris filed his Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction on September 10, 1999. Karen
Butler and Mark Butler filed their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Personal
Jurisdiction on September 22, 1999. Karen Butler and Mark Butler filed their Responsive
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the Supplemental Memorandum on October 14,
1999. Oral hearing on the jurisdictional motion was held on September 29,1999. Having
considered the foregoing, the Court now issues this Memorandum Decision.
The undisputed facts relevant to this motion are as follows:
1. Emily Hope Harris was born October 26, 1994, to Karen Harris nka Karen Butler
and Charles Erik Harris.
2. Karen Butler and Charles Eric Harris were divorced on July 21,1995, pursuant to
an order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San
Diego (hereinafter "California Court").
3. Since entry of the order of divorce, Karen Butler relocated with Emily Hope Harris
to Maryland, and subsequently to Utah where Karen Butler and Emily Hope Harris have
resided for in excess of two (2) years.
4. Charles Erik Harris' parents, Charles & Leanne Harris were granted grandparent
visitation rights in the California Court in 1995 which were subsequently revised in 1997.
5. Karen Butler and Mark Butler were married on November 24, 1997.
6. Karen Butler was held in contempt of court by the California Court in an Order Q$r*$£ j ^
Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt signed by the California Court on February 2 1 , 1 9 9 ^
The contempt was for Karen Butler's failure to keep Charles & Leanne Harris informed of

*
^ & i0t

Karen Butler's and Emily Hope Hams' address and phone number and to allow
grandparent visitation. Karen Butler was sentenced to five (5) days in jail suspended upon
Karen Butler's successful completion of two (2) years of probation without further violation
of the California Court's order.
7. Charles Erik Harris continues to live in California.

Charles Erik Harris' first jurisdictional argument is that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in this case by virtue of the Parental Kidnaping Prevent Act ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C.
§1738A, which provides in its relevant parts as follows:
§1738A Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this
section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently
with the provisions of this section by a court of another State
(b) As used in this section, the term-

(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child,
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of
a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary
orders, and initial orders and modifications,

(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation determination
which modifies replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior
custody or visitation determination concerning the same child, whether made by the
same court or not,

At issue in this case is whether a termination proceeding brought pursuant to Section
78-3a-401 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, constitutes a "custody
determination" or a "modification" of a custody or visitation determination under PKPA
There is no Utah case directly on point on this issue. However, the Utah Court of
Appeals addressed the question of whether a termination proceeding is a "custody
proceeding" under Utah's Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act, Section 78-45c-1 et
seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended ("Utah's UCCJA"), in State of Utah in the
interest of R.N. J., 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995)("RMJ."). In R.N.J., an adoptive father
sought a Utah order of termination of his parental rights subsequent to his and the child's
mother's divorce in California. The child's mother argued that the Utah court lacked
-2-

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah's UCCJA where the California court had issued
a divorce decree which included a custody determination.
The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed and ruled that a termination proceeding is not
a custody proceeding under Utah's UCCJA. The Utah Court of Appeals reasoned as
follows:
Rather, we conclude that a proceeding involving the termination of a parent's rights
and obligations is not a custody proceeding under the Utah UCCJA This conclusion is
supported by Utah's statutory scheme A "custody determination" is defined in the Act as
"a court decision and court orders and instructions providing the custody of a child, including
visitation rights, it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary
obligation of any person" Utah Code Ann § 78-45-45c-2(2) (1992) A "custody
proceeding" under the Utah UCCJA, "includes proceedings in which a custody
determination is one of several issues, such as an action of dissolution of marriage " Id §
78-45c-2(3) Therefore, although these definitions make clear that the California case
involving the dissolution of the parties' marriage and the custody of R N J was a custody
proceeding under the Utah UCCJA, these definitions do not clarify whether this proceeding
involving the termination of the adoptive father's rights and obligations also was a custody
proceeding
Other provisions of the Utah Code, however, lead to the conclusion that a termination
proceeding is not a custody proceeding The Juvenile Courts Act specifically separates
termination of parental rights proceedings and custody proceedings Juvenile Courts are
granted exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving the termination of parent's rights
with a limited exception not relevant here See Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-16(2)(f)
(Supp 1995), id §78-30-4 16(1 )(b) District courts, however, have original jurisdiction over
cases involving "questions of custody" and the juvenile court may only hear custody cases
if they have first been certified by the district court Id § 78-3a-16(3), see also id § 78-3a17(4)
In addition, our conclusion is consistent with the general principal "that when two
statutory provisions conflict, the more specific provision will prevail over the more general
provision " Williams v Public Sen/ Comm'n, 754 P 2d 41,48 (Utah 1988) The termination
of Parental Rights Act (TPR Act) specifically "provides a judicial process for voluntary and
involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship " Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-402(1)
(Supp 1995) Utah's TPR Act, taken in conjunction with section 78-3a-16(2)(f) of the Utah
Code, which grants exclusive original jurisdiction to juvenile courts in termination
proceedings, provides a specific statutory framework to follow in termination proceedings
These specific statutory provisions prevail over that more general provisions of the Utah
UCCJA, which makes no specific reference to termination proceedings
Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that" 'the later expression of the
legislature'" controls when statutes conflict or overlap in their treatment of the same subject
matter Murray City v Hall, 663 P 2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983) (quoting 2A C Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51 02 at 290 (4th ed 1973) The Utah Legislature
enacted the Utah UCCJA in 1980 See Law of Feb 1, 1980, ch 41, 1980 Utah Laws 290
The legislature enacted the TPR Act twelve years later in 1992 See Law of Feb 26, 1992,
ch 221, 1992 Utah Laws 826 Therefore, to the degree that conflict or overlap may exist
between the two acts, the Utah TPR Act supersedes the Utah UCCJA
Following this statutory scheme, Utah's appellate courts also have kept separate the
concepts of "child custody" and "termination of parental rights" See, e g, Sanderson v
Tryon, 739 P 2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987) (noting that "the standard governing actions for
termination of parental rights is not applicable to child custody disputes"), State ex rel
J J T, 877 P 2d 161, 165 & nn 4 & 5 (Utah App 1994) (distinguishing between depriving
parent of custody of child and terminating parent's rights), State ex rel DM, 790 P 2ds 562
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567-68 & nn 2 & 3 (Utah App 1990) (distinguishing between legal custody and termination
of parental rights and the requirements of each), InreN H B, 769 P 2d 844,851 (Utah App
1898) (listing terms "child custody and "termination of parental rights" separately in
discussion of juvenile court jurisdiction)
The mother cites cases from other states to support her argument that we should find
that a case involving the termination of a parent's rights is a child custody proceeding under
the Utah UCCJA See In re David C, 152 Cal App 3d 1189, 200 Cal Rptr 115 (1984), In
reAEH,W
Wis 2d 277,468 N W2d 190, cert denied, 502 U S 925,112 S Ct 338,116
L Ed 2d 278 (1991) We are not persuaded by these cases because they are based on
statutory schemes different from that scheme adopted in Utah
We conclude that the provisions of the Utah UCCJA do not apply to a case such as
this that involves the termination of parental rights and obligations

908 P.2d at 4 348-49.
A "custody determination" is defined in Utah's UCCJA as "a court decision and court
orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights...
Section 78-45c-2(2). A "modification decree" is defined as "a custody decree which
modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior
decree or by another court." Section 78-45c-2(7). Utah's UCCJA definitions of the
foregoing terms are virtually identical to the PKPA definitions of the same terms.
The same line of reasoning applied by the Utah Court of Appeals may be applied to
this case: 1. PKPA does not clarify whether a termination proceeding is a custody
proceeding; 2.

Utah's termination statute is a separate and distinct statutory provision

from Utah's custody and visitation statute, and from PKPA. There are specific statutory
provisions determining which matters may be dealt with by the district and juvenile courts;
3.

Utah's termination statute is the more specific statutory provision with regard to

termination; and 4. Utah's appellate courts have kept separate the concepts of termination
and custody and visitation.
The parties have argued two Texas cases which considered whether a termination
proceeding is a custody proceeding under PKPA. One Texas appellate court concluded
that a termination proceeding was not a custody proceeding under PKPA {Williams v.
Knott, 690 SW2d 605 (Tex App. Austin 1985)), and another Texas appellate court
concluded it was (White v. Blake, 859 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App. Tyler 1993)). Though the
results were different, both cases analyzed whether a termination proceeding was a
custody proceeding by construing Texas law, including Texas statutes (of which the Texas
version of UCCJA is one) and case law.
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The analyses in the two Texas cases are very similar to the analysis in R.A/.J.,
especially the analysis in Williams, supra, which has a nearly identical result to that of
R.N.J.. In any event, R.N.J., being a Utah Court of Appeals decision, has the greater
weight of authority in this case.
Where "custody determination" and "modification" are similarly defined in PKPA and
Utah's UCCJA, and the Utah Court of Appeals has already ruled in R.N.J, that a
termination proceeding is not a "custody proceeding" or "modification" as defined by Utah's
UCCJA, this Court rules that neither is a termination proceeding a "custody proceeding"
nor "modification" under PKPA. Accordingly, PKPA does not preclude this Court from
having subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Charles Erik Harris' second jurisdictional argument is that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Charles Erik Harris in this case where he does not "live in Utah", has not
had "any involvement with [Utah]", nor has he "purposely availed himself of the rights and
benefits of [Utah]."
A termination proceeding involves "status jurisdiction" and as such does not require
the minimum contacts necessary for in personam jurisdiction in many other kinds of
litigation.

Williams v. Knott,

690 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. App. 3 Dist.1985), citing

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95
(1945), Shaefferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed. 2d 683(1977), and
Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 90, 98 S.Ct. 1690,1695, 56 LEd.2d 132
(1978). Accordingly, this Court has in personam jurisdiction over Charles Erik Harris in this
case.
Charles Erik Harris and his parents, Charles and Leanne Harris, also argue that as
grandparents with court ordered visitation in the California case, Charles and Leanne
Harris are "contestants" under PKPA and can "claim rights." However, where this Court
has ruled that the termination proceeding in this case is not a custody proceeding under
PKPA, any rights the grandparents may have under PKPA are not available in this case.
Where Charles and Leanne Harris"have not moved to intervene nor have they been
granted intervention status in this case, it would be inappropriate for this Court to rule
further at this time as this Charles and Leanne Harris' rights or standing on this case.
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Accordingly, Charles Eric Harris' Motion to Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction is denied. Counsel for Mark Butler and Karen Butler
are directed to prepare a formal order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision.

Dated November

f .1999.
THE COURT

FILED
NOV - 81999

*iuv*nKa Court
Alt ^strict

\>!^^"''&\

mm
ISnyE.Jon*.3u«fc,'*!£S^

«?Ss^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
, 1999, I mailed a copy of the above order to Attorney
certify on November
Roger Baron, 45 N 100 E, Brigham City UT 84302; Attorney D. Miles Holman, 9537 S 700
E, Sandy UT 84070, and Attorney Frances M. Palacios, 357 W 200 E St #101, Salt Lake
City UT 84111.

Deputy Clerk

HW - 81999
'^GOfcj
^§5

. ^ . ' ^ A vu

-6-

2
3
4

Hildy L. Fentin, Esq. (Bar #111518)
MCDONALD & ALLEN, A.P.C
550 West "C" Street, Suite 2050
San Diego, California 92101
(619) 232-2050
Attorneys for Petitioner
KAREN HARRIS
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

10
11

In Re Marriage of

Case No. D 391902

12

Petitioner:

13

and

14

Respondent:

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO
BIFURCATE THE ISSUES OF
CHILD CUSTODY AND
VISITATION AND FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT THEREON

KAREN HARRIS

CHARLES ERIK HARRIS

15

DATE:
TIME:
DEPT:

16

July 21, 1995
8:30 a.m.
F-3

17
18

It is hereby stipulated by and between Petitioner, KAREN

19

HARRIS, with the approval and consent of her attorneys of record

20

Hildy L. Fentin of McDonald & Allen and Respondent, CHARLES ERIK

21

HARRIS, with the approval and consent of his attorney of record

22

Thomas Huguenor, that the issues of child custody*and visitation

23

may be bifurcated from the remaining issues in the dissolution of

24

marriage proceeding and that a Judgment may be entered on the

25

issues of child custody and visitation as follows:

26

1.

Bifurcation.

The issues of child custody and

27

visitation shall be bifurcated from the remaining issues in the

28

dissolution of marriage proceeding, and a Judgment of Dissolution
03997.001\hlf\26384
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1

of Marriage shall be entered on the issues of child custody and

2

visitation only, incorporating therein by reference the terms of

3

this Stipulation and Order.

4

2.

Reservation of Jurisdiction.

The court shall sever and

5

reserve jurisdiction over all other issues including but not

6

limited to the nature, value and extent of community property of

7

the parties, the division of property, child support, spousal

8

support, attorneys fees and costs, restraining orders and the

9

marital status of the parties.

10

3.

Temporary Orders.

Except as modified herein, all

LI

pendente lite orders presently in effect or entered hereafter,

.2

including but not limited to personal and property restraining

3

orders and stay-away orders, shall remain in full force and

4 (I effect subsequent to the granting of this Order and the Entry of
any Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (child custody and
visitation only) until the time of trial or further order of the
court.
4*

Child custody/Visitation.

The recommendation of Daniel

O'Roarty, Ph*D., filed with the court on June 9, 1995, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by reference, shall become the Order of the Court as specifically
set forth herein.
a.

Legal Custody.

Petitioner, KAREN HARRIS, shall

have sole legal custody of the parties' minor child, Emily
Harris, born October 26, 1994.
b.

Physical custody.

Petitioner, KAREN HARRIS, shall

have sole physical custody of the parties' minor child and shall
be permitted to move, with her daughter, to the State of Maryland
03997.001\hlf\26384
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or after Saturday, August 5, 1995.
c.

Visitation.

At such time as Petitioner moves to

-yland and so long as Respondent, CHARLES ERIK HARRIS/ complies
:h the psychotherapy, drug testing and Narcotics Anonymous
areinafter

f,

NAn) provisions set forth hereinbelow at paragraph

and does not test positive on any drug test, Respondent shall
ve supervised visitation rights with the minor child in the
:ate of Maryland upon thirty days written notice to Petitioner
i advance of each visit.

Said visits shall be supervised

irough a public program or privately contracted supervisor who

or bvj ctf^ef o£ ihe, Qx<\.

£ W

s mutually agreed to by the parties0A Visits shall be for tntee
ours in duration, and shall be set at such times as is mutually
igreed to by the parties/^and shall not include overnights.

Any

;hange in the duration of Respondent's visits with the minor
zhild shall be determined by the person supervising the
visitations or further court order,
5.

Notification of Residence/Employment,

Respondent shall

notify Petitioner in writing,^within 48 hours of any change of
his residence and place of employment and shall provide to
Petitioner the address and telephone number of his residence, and
the name, address and telephone number of his place of
employment.
6.

Parenting Class•

Respondent shall complete a parent

education program to increase his knowledge of child development
issues and dynamics.

Said program shall be completed within one

year and Respondent shall provide to Petitioner a certificate of
completion of said parenting course.
03997.001\hlf\26384
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Petitioner's Counseling.

Petitioner shall continue in I

counseling/^to reinforce parenting skills and abilities which will
enhance her self-esteem and provide her with greater autonomy,
10.

Visitation Pending Petitioner's Move.

Pending

Petitioner^ move to Maryland, Respondent shall have the
following supervised^visitation rights which shall be supervised
by Creative Visitation:
Saturday, July 22, 1995, 2 hours;
Tuesday, July 25, 1995, 2 hours;
Sunday, July 3 0, 1995, 2 hours;
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, 2 hours; and
Thursday, August 3, 1995, 2 hours.
In the event said times are not available to the
Creatiefi Visitation program, visitations shall take place as
mutually agreed and arranged by Petitioner, Respondent and
Creative Visitation. Sa\A ^stfa^OTS S ^ \ V?e S c ^ r J N ^ J M
11.

Communicatiorr/iCo-Parenting Sfcills.

L

^ £

a

:

Pending ^v^^p^cc^V^:
3c

Petitioner'sraovoto Maryland, Petitioner and Respondent jsjiaUJ^,,.
/^participate in four one-hour sessions of counseling; two sessions'

(see sft*>-r

fc

with Lydia Roper and two sessions with No^l Evans, to discuss coparenting and communication issues.

Said sessions shall take

place prior to August 5, 1995 as follows:
a.
Lydia Roper: Friday, July 21, 1995 at 1:00 p.m.;
b.

Lydia Roper: Tuesday, July 25, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.;

c.

No^l Evans: At such times as are determined

i

I

between Petitioner, Respondent and Dr. Evans• K ^

sYsW

• * . ±

?

\^, -rl*
SM&lJ

hnrrari nn-thr nnrmmptipris-that P e t i t i o n e r vii-1 r e s i d e i n Maryland
w i t h her p a r e n t s f o r a p e r i o d of t w e l v e a o n t h s andj^fmt
u^Vo V* £®V> a^aoi.e ixjci\\<j^rdr\u, \>N te*h£\C^ rro\\) putf *O vro^rift
octets
Kooponden-fc; will r^aid-e-i-n thQ Stato of California.
\
.j*,..
o£ v c ^ t e c ^ . A ^ \ \ \ 0 D D ^ } voviYiooercv^w r>t>*fo WoooecftT* u/mnq
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Psychotherapy/Drug Testing/Narcotic* Anonymous <NA)

Participation.

Respondent's rights of visitation provided herein

are specifically contingent upon his compliance with the
following:
a.

Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall

participate in weekly individual psychotherapy with Nool Bvang,
pSs-Dr^ Respondent shall authorize B*H«—Eyano to provide to
-\VvC ^V-ONO^-V y^

^v^v
^ ^

Petitioner a monthly attendance record verifying Respondent's
weekly participation in psychotherapy.
b.

Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall submit /

to random urine drug screens one time a week at the San Diego
Health AllianceX
marijuana.

/5/

ryfh

Drug screening shall cover all drugs including

Respondent shall authorise the San Diego Health

c< o^berc^q ^ e e o v r a tesc\^V\A <J

Alliance.to release the-rksults ox each drug test to his
therapist,—N-eel-Evemg, and to Petitioner^ therapist, iiydiet
Ropjsr, who shall be authorized to provide a copy of the results
J

to Petitioner.
c.

o
1
2
!3
>4
25

Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall

actively participate in Narcotics Anonymous and shall participate
in weekly meetings two times each week.

Respondent shall provide

Petitioner with the name of his sponsor and shall provide to
Petitioner, on a monthly basis, a copy of his attendance record
which shall be signed by his sponsored

Telephone Contact* ftfc^HK?h"-<fej^re

26

oJ^a-'Grawgk^-^-c^

27

telephone contactxtwo times per week on Mondays and Wednesdays

28

between 6:30 and 7:30 p^m* Eastern Standard Time/ / /
03997.001\hlf\26384
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Present
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TIME y-3o

'

I

OEPT

STIPULATION AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
(Local Rules, Division 111, Rule 1.6(g))
ner- D Husband,, TZJ^Wife,
Attorney
4 l U ^ l

HEARING DATE . . " \ \ S \

CASE NUMBER

3> 2rtW09i

represented by

D Wcpt present ,

represented by

•HE PARTIES STIPULATE AND AGREE as follows:

ran

W VterraVons shs>l\ Wlfe^ rM£^r>'for,

Aromeof

^. 9e+rhnnfiT 9,V\ s>\\ g,van
ifgfe^f

DUO

^EAS

XM~
occur at <t)c VU3
h3

\/I^4-

rftfv/ TO,n

ffHSQt4

V nn rrpfr*, Hfcn

TER CONTINUED TO:
Attorney for Husband

pi - f r r o e , ^

et

M.
Attorney for w / a

SIGN? TURE OF PARTIES
* read the entire stk ilation and agreement.
understand it fully and request the Codft to make our stiptoation
lent the Court^6rder. We understand that wilKul failure to comply wrth the provisions of ^iis order will\j>e a
f Court and may be punished by fine and imprisonment We waive all further not|/2fe of this order.

y<

Husband

Wife

D and Dated
Judge of tho Supa/ior Court
•t6)

STIPULATION AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSc

JL

n

13.

There shall be no change in the foregoing custody and

visitation arrangement except upon a shoving of a substantial
change in circumstances which would include, in this instance,
Respondent's ability to establish consistency and stability in
his life and in all matters mentioned hereinabove.
14.

Enforcement of Terms of Stipulation - Pees and Coats.

Should it be necessary for either party to bring an action in
this or any other court for the enforcement of any of the
provisions of this Stipulation, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to an award from the other party of his or her
reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in the action.
15.

Acknowledgments.

Each party to this Stipulation

acknowledges and declares that he or she respectively:
a.

Is fully and completely informed as to the facts

relating to the subject matter of this Stipulation and as to the
rights and liabilities of both parties;
b.

Enters into this Stipulation voluntarily, free

from fraud, undue influence, coercion or duress of any kind;
c.

Has given careful and mature thought to the making

of this Stipulation; and
d.

Fully and completely understands the legal effect

of each provision of this Stipulation.
There have been no promises, agreements, or
undertakings of either of the parties to the other, except as set
forth in this Stipulation, relied upon by either as a matter of
inducement to enter into this Stipulation.

Each party has read

the Stipulation and is fully aware of its contents and its legal
effect.
03997-00l\hlf\263Q4
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1
2

16. Waivers•

As to the issues of child custody and

visitation only, each party waives:

3

a.

Notice of time and place of trial, Statement of

4

Decision, Notice of Entry of Judgment, Notice of Appeal of the

5

Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage addressing the child custody

6

and visitation issues;

7

b«

Time to appeal the Judgment of Dissolution of

8

Marriage (custody and visitation only) and all rights to make a

9

motion for a new trial or for reconsideration; and

10
11

c.

Any and all other notices pertaining to this

proceeding.

12

As to the issues of child custody and visitation only,

13

the court may enter, upon application by Petitioner consistent

14

with this Order, a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (child

15

custody/visitation only) without waiting for the required periods

16

for notice of appeal.

17

17,

Release of Restraining Order,

The restraining order

18

providing that neither party shall remove the minor child from

19

the State of California or the County of San Diego shall be

20

released and dissolved with respect to Petitioner.

21

the terms of this stipulation, Petitioner may permanently move to

22

the State of Maryland with the minor child on or after Saturday,

23

August 5, 1995.

24'

civil Procedure §917.7 providing for a stay for thirty days of

25

any Judgment entered providing for the removal of a minor child

26

from the State of California, shall be waived,

27
28

18.

Pursuant to

Accordingly, the provisions set forth in Code of

The parties hereto hereby agree and acknowledge that

they have read the foregoing Stipulation and Order, that they
03997,001\hlf\26384
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understand it fully and request the court to make this
Stipulation the court's order,

The parties further represent and

acknowledge that they understand that willful failure to comply
with the provisions of this Order shall be a contempt of court
and may be punished by fine and imprisonment.

The parties

further waive all further notice of this Order.
1

3

0

Dated:

ifaftsr

Dated:

1EN HARRIS, Petitioner

*7 • 2 ) • 4*£

5S "ERIK HARRIS,
Respondent

1
2

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

3

Dated:

4

McDonald & Allen

Dated:

-lIsvlQ^

5
.6

/ he?£~*L+O />?

Hildy pi Fentin, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

Thomas Hugu
Attorney fo

.7
LB
L9
>0

"?'• 2 / - <9_b

xj, Esq.
spondent

ORDER
Upon reading and considering the foregoing, and for good
cause shown, IT IS SO ORDERED.

21
22
23

Dated: '1^X\~~/1

^

JUDGE OF
)F T/iE SUPERIOR COURT

24

WESLEY R MASON

25
26
27
28
03997.001\hlf\26384
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1 - ^ ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIOHNEY (*««.

AOJtOSS)

TELEPHONE NC

1

FOR COURT U S € ONLY

J
.
(619) 2B2-20S'
' H i l d y L. F e n t i n , E s q . (Bar #111518)
'cDONALD & ALLEN
50 W e s t " C " S t r e e t , S u i t e 2 0 5 0
a n D i e g o , CA 9 2 1 0 1
rT0RNEYF0R«*«): K a r e n H a r r i s
SUPERIOR COURT Of-' CALIF0 RNIA, COUNTY OF S A N DIEGO
STREETADORESS 1 5 5 i _ 5 5 s i x t h
Avenue
MAILING ADDRESS. S a n D i e g o , CA 9 2 1 0 1
CITY AND ZIP C 0 0 E :

BRANCH NAME: F a m i l y

Court

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KAREN HARRIS
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
CLAIMANT:
1

CHARLES ERIK

HARRIS

CHARLES E . H A R R I S , J R . a n d
LEANNE CATHERINE HARRIS
CASE NUMBER.

FINDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING
D 391902
1. This proceeding was heard

on (date): 1 1 / 2 0 / 9 5
by Judge (name): E d w a r d

at (time): 1 : 4 5 p . m . inDept.:F-5
Huntington
•
Temporary Judge

B.

Room:

•
Petitioner/plaintiff present
QQ Attorney present (name): H i l d y L . F e n t i n , E s q ,
I 1 Respondent/defendant present
•
Attorney present (name):
CX) Claimant present
CX] Attorney present (name). Thomas M. Huguenot", E s q .
On the order to show cause or motion filed (dale): 8 / 2 / 9 5
by (name): C l a i m a n t s
Z THE COURT ORDERS
f X I As attached

I

I Not applicable

•

As attached

PCI Not applicable

I

1 As attached

CS] Not applicable

I

I As attached

[2D Not applicable

3. Custody and visitation:
4. Child support:
5. Spousal-Family support:
6. Property orders:
7. Domestic Violence Miscellaneous Orders

I

8. Other orders:

CS3 Not applicable

n

As attached

1 As attached

[3D Not applicable

j fees v(specify
~,
, amount):
- .1, ,~0w0w0. .w0~0
•
payable as child support
•
9. ED
L ^ J Attorney
v . ^$
Payable to (name and address): H i l d y L . F e n t i n , E s q . o f M c D o n a l d

payable as spousal support

§

Allen,

550 West "C" S t r e e t , S u i t e 2050, San Diego, C a l i f o r n i a 92101
Payable •forthwith GQ other (specify): Commencing 1 / 1 / 9 6 , i n monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s c
$100.00 u n t i l p a i d i n f u l l .
10. All other issues are reserved until further order of the court.

•

Date:

JUDGL Of 1NL 5UPLMIOH COUHF

Approved as conforming to court order.

n HT'
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY FOR |

A PETITIONCR/PLAINTIFF •

PHOMAS M. HUGUERQJR,

Attorney

RESPONDCNT/DCFENDANT

for

Claimants
(Continued)

Form Adopted by Rulo 1296 31
Jud»c»al Council of California

FINDINGS AND U H O E R AFfEh HtAnKiG
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TACHMENT TO
JDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING
EARING: 11/20/95)

MARRIAGE O F HARRIS
SDSC CASE NO. D 391902

VISITATION.
Based on the oral stipulation of the parties in open court, the paternal
grandparents, LEANNE CATHERINE HARRIS and CHARLES E. HARRIS,
JR. (hereinafter the "Claimants"), shall have visitation wkh Emily Hope Harris,
born October 26, 1994, as set forth in paragraphs 1-5 (Agreements) and
paragraphs 1, 2 (partial), and 3, 4 and 5 (Recommendations) of the Family Court
Services recommendation of.Sandra Boyles, MFCC, dated October 2, 1995,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," as follows:
(a)

Claimants shall visit with Emily in the county and state in which
Petitioner resides, and shall provide to Petitioner 30 days written
notice in advance of Claimants' visitation with the minor child.

(b)

Unless otherwise agreed to by Petitioner and Claimants, for the first
two days of each visit, the visit shall occur in Petitioner's residence,
to allow the child to reacquaint herself with Claimants, and the
Claimants to familiarize themselves with the minor child's
adjustment, routines and developmental needs.

(c)

After a period of time, to be determined as set forth horcinbclow at
subparagraph (j), the minor child shall visit with Claimants, away
from Petitioner's home and supervision, for four to eight hours each
day. The exact hours shall be determined by mutual agreement of
Petitioner and Claimants based on the child's needs at flic time.
Petitioner shall have the final say on the pick-up and return times
each day.

(d)

Claimants shall provide Petitioner with an itinerary, a local address
and telephone number, before removing the minor child from
Petitioner's residence.

(e)

There shall be no overnight visitations with Claimants unless
mutually agreed upon by Petitioner and Claimants.
Pago 2 of 3
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(HEARING: 11/20/95)

MARRIAGE OF IIARRIS
SDSC CASE NO. D 391902

(0

At no time shall Respondent, CHARLES ERIK HARRIS, be
present during visits between Claimants and the minor child.

(g)

Claimants shall not smoke when the minor child is in their presence.

(h)

Claimants may have reasonable telephone contact with the minor
child.

(i)

Claimants and Petitioner shall keep each other informed of their
current addresses and telephone numbers at all times.

Upon reading and considering the pleadings filed with the court and oral
argument of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
(j)

The frequency and length of each of Claimants' visits shall be as
follows:
i)

1996. Four times per year for up to seven days, which shall
include the minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home;

ii)

1997. Six times per year for up to seven days, which shall
include the minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home; and

iii)

1998. So long as there have been no problems in the
visitation schedule and Claimants are complying with the
terms of the court order as set forth herein, six times per year
for up to 10 days in duration, which shall include the
minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home.

(k)

Prior to Claimants exercising their visitation rights as set forth
herein, Claimants shall attend and pay for four counseling sessions
with Noll Evans, Ph.D., to address the issue of abuse contained in
Petitioner's pleadings. After the completion of the four sessions,
Claimants shall instruct Noll Evans to provide to Petitioners
attorney proof of attendance of said sessions.

(1)

The court shall reserve jurisdiction to review the visitation orders
contained herein.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

10 In Re Marriage of
11 Petitioner:
12

15

and

Claimants:

CASE NO. D 391902

)

AMENDED
ORDER AFTER HEARING

KAREN HARRIS

13 II Respondent
14

)

CHARLES ERIK HARRIS
CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR.
and LEANNE HARRIS

16
17

The first motion in this case was filed by Petitioner on 4/29/96 to terminate

18 the grandparents' visitation which had been set by stipulated order on 11/20/95. On
19 8/15/96 Petitioner filed an additional motion for a psychological evaluation to determine
20 if the grandparents' unsupervised visits with Emily are in the child's best interests.
21 During this period a report and recommendation was filed by Ms. Boyies of Family
22 Court Services dated 7-24-96. By stipulation in Court on 11/20/95 the parties adopted
23 the 10/2/95 Family Court Services' report by Ms. Boyies. In that order the frequency
24 of visitation periods was set at four in 1996, increased to six in 1997 for up to seven
25 days and increased in 1998 for up to ten days.
26

The Court took testimony fiom Ms. Boyies, reviewed the cnluc history ol

27 the file, read the grandparents' factual declarations on both sides of the family, anc
28

reviewed Dr. O'Roarty's evaluation.

1

The Court did not consider the declarati

s of either Dr. Rasmusson or Dr.

2 Evans.
3

The sole issue presented to the Court is 'hether to continue the Court-

4 ordered visitation by the grandparents and if so, should tht ,ourt order a psychological
5 evaluation.
6

The Court finds that in spite of the significant shortcomings of Respondent

7 Charles Erik Harris, the grandparents are, in fact, entitled to continue their right under
8 the law and under the Court's existing orders to have visitation with their granddaughter,
9 Emily. Having read all of the declarations, the Court does not find the requisite change
) I of circumstances to terminate the grandparents' visitation The conflicts that have
occurred are the normal conflicts between opposing families in a dissolution. The
conflicts are not sufficient to trigger a significant change in the terms of visitation.
The Court hereby makes one modification as to the frequency of the visits
and sets the number of visits at a maximum of four visits per year for up to seven days.
The reason for the limitation of four visits per year is that at Emily's age more than four
is burdensome for all parties. As Emily grows older the Court reserves the right to
increase or decrease the number of visits per year based upon Emily's age appropriate
needs.

This shall include the first two days at Petitioner's home or a place to be

mutually agreed upon out of the home. This shall continue until further order of the
Court.
After the first two days it is the Court's order that visitation shall take place
out of the home for a period of up to six hours each. If mother feels that it is necessary
for any reason she may designate a one-day break during the remaining five days.
(This could be for rest, for church, for a birthday or any other reason.) She is to advise
he grandparents at the commencement of each visitation period. This is not to reduce
n any way the total of seven visitation days.
If the parties fail to agree on the visitation hours then visitation shall
ommence at 10:00 a.m. and end no later than 4:00 p.m.
2

The grandparents shall

determine when to return Emily home based upon Emily's needs and wishes and within
the above-Stated times, If petitioner for any reason does not have Emily ready at 10.00
3 a.m. the 4:00 p.m. return time may be adjusted commensurately.
4

The Court at this time makes no order for a psychological evaluation

5 There does not appear to be any basis for such an evaluation and the Court is
6

persuaded that the information would surely demonstrate that there is a strong anger

7 or conflict between mother and her family and the paternal grandparents.
8

Therefore, neither the mother nor the grandparents are to disparage each

9 other or in any way convey their beliefs and attitudes regarding this case to Emily.
10

All other orders and Family Court Services recommendations not in conflict

11 with this order are to remain in effect as orders of the Court.
12
13

DATED: / // ^'j /

7
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16
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

?_"

CASE NO. D 391902
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause referred to herein
On the date as shown below, at San Diego, California, I personally served
a true copy of AMENDED ORDER AFTER HEARING in a separate envelope
addressed to each addressee as listed below:
Danielle E. Negroni
McDonald & Allen
550 West C Street, Suite 2050
San Diego, CA92101
Paul W. Leehey
205 West Alvarado Street
Fallbrook, CA 92028

ftp J'hnu

£ MAHTOW jOj

NOV 2 2 W6
8y T DEEGAiy 0ecut\

NOV 2 2 1996
JATED:
KENNETH E. MARTONE
Clerk of the Superior Court

BfW\MJ

\h&af\

I erry U^tegan, Dejputy

4

\^J

1 LAW OFFICE OF PAUL W. LEEHEY
205 West Alvarado Street
2 Fallbrook, CA 92028
Telephone:
(760) 723-0711
3 State Bar #92009
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If

4 Attorney for Claimants

K^

8

I

['.
,>• ...
K,|
°-' • "•• - .';,';'wJ( /flj
JAN 2 I IQQQ

5
6
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, NORTH COUNTY BRANCH
9
In Re Marriage of

CASE NO. D 391902 TXA

PETITIONER: KAREN HARRIS

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT

10
11
and
12
RESPONDENT: CHARLES ERIK HARRIS
13
CLAIMANTS:

CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR
and LEANNE HARRIS

14
15

COMES NOW, the Court, the Honorable Thomas Ashworth Judge of the

16 Superior Court presiding, on January 20, 1998 in Department F-3 of
17

the

above

entitled

18 Declaration

Court,

for Contempt

upon

filed

the

Order

on December

to
1,

Show

1997 by

Cause

and

Claimants

19 LEANNE AND CHARLES E. HARRIS JR., as to Citee KAREN HARRIS, now KAREN
20 BUTLER, Petitioner herein; and after the Court advised Citee of the
21 potential

fine and/or jail time if found guilty of each count of

22 contempt, and of her rights, including the right not to testify, the
23

right to cross examine witnesses, the right to present evidence on

24 her behalf, the right to have an attorney represent her and if not
25

that an attorney may be appointed for her and the right to represent

26

herself; and upon Citee stating that she desired to represent herself

27

and to go forward with the proceedings; the Court proceeded with the

20

hearing

and

thereafter

upon

hearing

the

opening

statement

of

Claimants' counsel, with no opening statement by Citee, the testimony
of Claimant LEANNE HARRIS, with no cross examination, testimony or
evidence presented by Citee, and the closing argument of Claimants'
Counsel, with no argument made by Citee, the COURT FOUND AND ORDERED
\S FOLLOWS:
1.

AS TO COUNT ONE:

The Court finds Citee guilty of Count

>ne, upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, for failing to
omply

with

the

Court's

order

entered

on

December

15, 1997,

hereafter confirmed on October 30, 1996 and November 21, 1996, to
eep Claimants informed at all times of Citee's address and phone
imbers, specifically her address and phone number upon her move from
iryland to Utah after December 1st 1996; and specifically finds that
tid order was a valid order of the Court, that Citee had knowledge
said order through her representation of Counsel when said order
s made and reaffirmed, that Citee failed to notify Claimants of her
dress and phone number and that said failure was a wilful violation
the Court's Order.
Based thereon, as to Count One, the Court sentences Citee KAREN
*RIS, now KAREN BUTLER, to five (5) days custody in the San Diego
inty Jail, but suspends said sentence and places Citee on probation
a period of tv/o years conditioned upon Citee's compliance with
the existing Orders of the Court, with any violation of any such
er shown by a preponderance of the evidence to result in the
osition of the aforesaid sentence.
2.

AS TO COUNT TWO;

The Court finds Citee guilty of Count

upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, for failing to
ply

with

the

Court's

Order

entered

on

December

lb,

1997,

treafter confirmed on October 30, 1996 and November 21, 1996, to

2

1 j allow Claimants vis'itation with their granddaughter Emily on December
2

1, 1996 and thereafter; and specifically finds that said order was a

3 valid order of the Court, that Citee had knowledge of said order
4

through her representation of Counsel when caid order was uu\de, that

5 on November 1, 1996 Claimants properly gave thirty

(30) days notice

6 of their right to exercise visitation to begin on December 1, 1996,
7

that Citee failed to comply with the Court's Order by not allowing

8 Claimants' visitation with Emily beginning on December 1, 1996 and
9

that said failure was a wilful violation of the Court's Order.

0

Based thereon, as to Count Two, the Court sentences Citee KAREN

1 HARRIS, now KAREN BUTLER, to five (5) days custody in the San Diego
2 County Jail, but suspends said sentence and places said Citee on
3 probation
4 compliance

for

a

with

period
all

the

of

two

years

existing

conditioned

Orders

of

the

upon

Court,

Citee's
with

any

5 violation of any such order shown by a preponderance of the* evidence
6 to result in the imposition of the aforesaid sentence.
7

3.

The Court finds that the financial requests of Claimants

8 for attorneys fees, costs and expenses will be more properly heard on
9 February 23, 1998 when Claimants have an Order to Show Cause set
0 regarding

the

same, and

at

which

time

the

Court

will

have

the

1 opportunity to review the financial situation of both Claimants and
2 Petitioner, as well as the conduct of Petitioner; and base& thereon
3 continues

and

defers

4

February 23, 1998.

5

///

6

///

7

///

8

///

those

financial

issues

to

the

hearing

of

4.

1

The Court, further notes that Petitioner KAREN HARRIS, nov/

2 BUTLER, represents that her address and phone number of record in
3 these proceedings, and as required under the existing orders of the
4 Court, is as follows:

Karen Butler, 655 Medoland Drive, Brigham

5 City, Utah, 04302, phone number (435) 723-9207.
6
7

IT

IS

SO

O R D E R E D .

8
9 Date:
10
11
12
13
14
15
y:harris.d1b

16
17
18
19
20
!1
2
3
4
5
3
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TIONEH/PLAIMTIFF: K a r e n
Harris

ZIPCOOE:
NCHNAWE:

Charles

IOENT/DEFENDANT:

Erik

Charles Jr.

CLAIMANT.-

Harris
& Leanne

Harris
CASE NUMBER.

FINDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING
mily Law - Domestic Violence Prevention - Uniform P a r e n t a g e )
3 proceeding was heard
(date): 5 / 5 / 9 9
Judge (name):

at (time): 8 : 4 5

a.m.
I

D3 9 1 ^ 0 2 TXA

in Dcpt.: F - 3

Room:

I Temporary Judge

3 HONORABLE THOMAS ASHWORTH
] Petitioner/plaintiff present
] Respondent/defendant present
] Claimant present C h a r l e s
K

&

Leann

Harris

-

the order to show cause or motion filed (date):

2/9/99

- a
by (name): C l a i m a n t s :
Charles
Leanne
Harris

IE COURT ORDERS
stody and visitation:

( X I As attached

I

1 Not applicable

lild support:

I

i As attached

I

I Not applicable

K)usal-Famiiy support:

I

I As attached

I

I Not applicable

-operty orders:

1 I As attached

(

1 Not applicable

omestic Violence Miscellaneous Orders

I

I As attached

ther orders:

I

I Not applicable

•

As attached

ZD Attorney fees (specify amount): $
>ayable to (name and address):
3

[S3 Attorney present (name) ROY M. D O P P E L T & A S S O .
1 I Attorney present (name)
I T ] Attorney present (name) PAUL W. LEEHEY

ayable

•

forthwith

•

•

payable as child support

Jr

•

Not applicable

•

payable as spousal support

other (specify):

Ml other issues are reserved until further order of the court.
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JUOCU Of THE M I P d l l O I H ' O U i l l

oved ajfeonforming to court orde

{
ATUREOF/s/rTORN^YFOR [ X ] PETITIO^I ft/FJLAINTIFF •

RESPONOENT/OEFENOANT

(Continucd)
>r:n AdoptedfcyRule 1233 31
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FINDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING
fFamily Law - Domestic Violence Prevention - Uniform Parentage)

< &

H ftE THE MARRIAGE OF HARRIS

CASE NO: D391302TXA

ATTACHMENT TO FINDINGS AND
ORDER AFTER HEARING
(HEARING 5/5/99)
CUSTODY AND VISITATION
Upon review of the evidence presented and after argument of
:ounsel, the Court made its findings on the record adopting the
'amily Court Services Report and Recommendations therein dated
larch 29, 1999 by Sandra Boyles, MFCC, counselor Family Court
ervices, with the exception of recommendations items number three
3) and seven (7) , as set forth in the attached copy thereof
ncorporated herein as Exhibit nAfl.
The Court further orders that the Claimant Grandparents
harles E. Harris Jr. and Leeann Harris shall not permit any
ontact between the minor grandchild, Emily, and Respondent Father
harles Erik Harris when they have the physical custody of said
hild.
The Court made no orders as to Respondent Charles Erik Harris 7
rder to Show Cause filed on February 25, 1999, which was continued
nd set for the same date and time, due to no appearance of
espondent at the hearing.

»arris.d5a

G. 5 5 r A.* 5 Y*
<
tments Fl/F.,F3/F4/F5/F6
LARRIS, D-391902

F \ i v i *> \ >

lopment and how she can rake
ortable and enjoyable.

Marcn 29, 1999
?a — "'

the cmld's

transitions

rore

MMrlMDftTTONS:
s therefore respectfully recommended:
Until
the
child
starts
public
school,
the
paternal
grandparents shall have four 7-day weeks with the child. Tne
first week to occur after this hearing shall occur at a place
selected by the paternal grandparents within the state of
Utah. The child shall have overnights with the grandparents
and shall be within easy access of the mother's residenfce in
the event that the child .needs to return home during the week,
Tne grandparents shall be the ones to determine if the child
needs to return before the seventh day. During the week, the
child shall have at least two telephone contacts with the
mother.
All subsequent visits with the paternal grandparents may occur
at the grandparents' home in San Diego County. Either of the
grandparents or another adult familiar to the child, shall
travel with the child to and from the grandparents' residence
in San Diego County.
Tne exact visitation weeks shall be determined by 30 days
prior written notice to the mother. The mother shall notify
the grandparents in advance of any vacation plans her family
may have so that the grandparents' dates do not interfere.
The grandparents' visits shall not occur at times of major
holidays unless agreed upon by the mother.
During the child's visits to San Diego, the grandparents may
make the child available for supervised visits v/ith the father
at a professional agency if agreed upon by the grandparents
and the father. At no time shall the father have contact with
the child that is solely supervised by the grandparents.
The grandparents shall have reasonable telephone contacts with
the child of at least once a week.
If the child p
not
available when they call, the mother shall assure the child
returns the call within 24 hours.
All correspondence
from the grandparents to the cnild
including packages and gifts shall be shared with the child
upon receipt. The mother shall respond to the grandparents
within one week by mail or telephone in order to acknowledge
receipt of the correspondence or package and the child's
Tf the mother -has specific requests for

MM (I S\< S
Departments Fl/F./F3/F4/F5/F6
Re; HARRIS, D-391902

March 29, 1999
Page 8

limitations en the numoer of Christmas items to be received,
she shall notify the grandparents in advance and they shall
make every effort to be sensitive to the mother's requests.
During the child's visits with the grandparents, they shall
assure that she is not exposed to cigarette smoke in buildings
or vehicles.
The mother shall be involved in counseling with a licensed
clinical therapist regarding issues related to the blended
family.
She shall sign a release for the therapist to
communicate
with
the
undersigned
regarding
, the
recommendations,
Tne purpose of the therapy shall be to
assist
the
mother, ^stepfather
and
stepchildren
in
understanding Emily's need for a positive relationship with
her father's family and the dynamics of such a relationship.
The grandparents shall be available for communication with the
therapist if the therapist feels it is appropriate.
All prior orders not in conflict with this parenting
shall remain in full force and effect.

plan

Respectfully submitted,
//

SANDRA BOYLES, MFCC
Counselor
(619)557-2116

55/mcLm
:c: Charles Harris
Leanne Harris
Paul Lehey, EsqKaren Harris
Kildy fentin, Esq,

